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ARGUMENT
I.

Community Caretaking Function.

In its Brief of Respondent, the State cites State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290 (Ct. App. 2003)
in support of its assertion that the "emergency aid doctrine is encompassed within the community
caretaking function, and has been applied to cases involving warrantless entries into homes."
Brief of Respondent, p. 9. While the Court of Appeals in Barrett did state that the emergency
aid doctrine is encompassed within the community caretaking function, the Court in Barrett did
not base its decision on the officer's community caretaking function. Rather, the Court based its

decision on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. Barrett, 138 Idaho at 295. The State has not cited any Idaho appellate opinion in
which the community caretaking function has been applied to a police officer's warrantless entry
into a citizen's home. This may be a matter of first impression in Idaho, which warrants a
discussion of legal authority from other jurisdictions.
The Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals
have considered cases regarding the application of the community caretaking doctrine to the
warrantless search of residential and commercial properties. Each court declined to extend the
community caretaking function of law enforcement officers to allow warrantless searches of
private homes or businesses. See Ray v. Township of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 177 (3 rd Cir. 2010)
("The community caretaking doctrine cannot be used to justify warrantless searches of a
home."); United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating, "we have
never explicitly held that the community caretaking functions of a police officer permits the
warrantless entry into a private home," and holding that officers' warrantless entry was not
1

objectively reasonable when it was not justified by any compelling exigency); United States v.
Bute, 43 F.3d 531 (10th Cir. 1994) (refusing to extend community caretaking function to

warrantless search of commercial garage); United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529 (9th Cir.
1993) (refusing to extend community caretaking function to warrantless search of private home);
United States v. Pichany, 687 F .2d 204 (7th Cir.1982) (refusing to extend community caretaking

function to warrantless search of warehouse).
State v. Gill, 755 N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 2008), is factually very similar to the current case,

and therefore a recitation of the facts in Gill is appropriate. In Gill,
[A] passerby witnessed and reported a car accident the afternoon of
December 2, 2006. The state radio dispatched that a vehicle went in a ditch and
struck a tree. The dispatch said it was unknown whether any injuries resulted from
the crash. Two officers responded to the dispatch.
The first officer to arrive at the scene testified that it appeared the vehicle
left the roadway, went in the snowy ditch, was airborne for a short distance,
traveled up an embankment, and struck a tree. The vehicle's driver appeared to
have attempted to get back on the road, but the vehicle was unable to reenter the
roadway because there was too much snow. Nobody was at the scene when the
officer arrived. The officer ran the vehicle's registration. The license plates did not
match the vehicle.
The passerby returned to the scene and spoke to the officer. The officer
testified that the passerby indicated he witnessed the vehicle driving from
shoulder to shoulder at forty-five degree angles before it went in the ditch; he
pulled to the shoulder of the road because he was scared the vehicle was going to
strike his vehicle; he observed one male occupant in the vehicle and someone who
picked up the occupant in a two-tone Dodge pickup and left the scene.
Another officer arrived on the scene. The officers began investigating
nearby farmhouses. They saw a farm with a two-tone Dodge pickup in the yard.
They entered the yard and spoke to an individual who said her husband had given
their neighbor a ride home earlier in the evening. She pointed the officers toward
Gill's farmstead.
The officers drove to Gill's farmstead. They observed a light on in the
house and pounded on the door for several minutes. Nobody answered the door.
2

They walked past a picture window and could see what appeared to be a male
sitting in a chair. They could only see the top of the individual's head from the
window because of how the chair was situated. They started knocking on the
window, then began pounding on the window when they received no response.
The officers testified that they pounded on the window so hard they were
concerned the window might break. The person in the chair was not moving at all.
One of the officers called their supervisor and advised him of the situation. About
one and one-half hours had passed from the time of the initial accident. The
officers testified that they were concerned for the individual's welfare and
received permission from their supervisor to enter the residence and check on the
welfare of the individual.
The officers testified that they went to the front door, entered the house,
and said something along the lines of, "is anybody home?" and "hello, hello,
anybody there?" They entered the room where the individual was sitting in the
chair. They shook him several times before he became conscious. They noticed an
extremely strong odor of alcoholic beverages. The officers testified that they
asked Gill if he had been drinking. Gill said he blew a tire and went in the ditch.
755 N.W.2d at 456 - 457.
Gill was charged with driving under the influence, driving without privileges, and
unlawful display of license plate or tab. 755 N.W.2d at 455. Gill filed a motion to suppress,
asserting that any and all evidence gathered from and after the officers' entry into his home
should be suppressed because the evidence was obtained unlawfully. Id. at 458. The trial court
denied Gill's motion to suppress, finding that the entry was justified as performance of the
officers' community caretaking function. Id. at 457. The case proceeded to trial, and Gill was
found guilty of all three charges. Id. Gill appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the community caretaking
doctrine was inapplicable to Gill's case because the scope of an officer's community caretaking
function does not encompass a dwelling place. 755 N.W.2d at 455. The court "decline[d] to
extend the scope of the community caretaking doctrine to include officers' entry into private
residences." Id. at 459. Citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), the court referred to
the previous "recognition of the distinction between motor vehicles and dwelling places." Id. at
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460. The court declined to consider whether the entry into Gill's home was justified under the
emergency doctrine, because the state raised that ground for the first time on appeal.
It is apparent that the warrant exceptions "community caretaking function", "emergency

aid doctrine", "emergency doctrine", and even "exigent circumstances" have been used
somewhat interchangeably by various courts, leading to a certain amount of confusion. In State
V.

Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 2009), the South Dakota Supreme Court analyzed the

distinction between these different doctrines:
A review of the case law reveals a breadth of decisions discussing and
applying various exceptions including the emergency doctrine, the emergency aid
doctrine, and the community caretaker doctrine.
Some of the avowed distinctions between these three doctrines can be frail,
bordering on the meaningless. Neither have they been consistently applied, thus
creating contradictory and sometimes conflicting doctrines. Some courts treat
these exceptions interchangeably. Others declare that the community caretaker
exception applies, but then use law applicable to one of the other exceptions, such
as the emergency doctrine. Several courts have also held that the emergency aid
doctrine is a subcategory of the community caretaker, exception, while the
emergency doctrine is a subcategory of the exigent circumstances exception.
775 N.W.2d at 232.
Regarding the community caretaking doctrine, the South Dakota Supreme Court
recognized that "[i]n several other jurisdictions, this exception has not easily evolved into an
exception applicable to homes. In fact, the Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as
North Dakota, have declined to extend the community caretaker exception to residential entries
because the Cady decision stressed the distinction between vehicles and dwellings." Id. at 236.
After a review of appellate opinions from several states, the Court concluded that
[I]t appears that the emergency aid doctrine differs from the community
caretaker exception in part on the fact that the title, emergency aid doctrine,
presumes an existing emergency to warrant the intrusion. Otherwise, this
doctrine, like the community caretaker exception, requires reasonableness on the
4

part of the officers and circumstances warranting the intrusion. We agree with
those courts holding that no useful distinction can be made between the
emergency doctrine and the emergency aid doctrine. Both require, at their
essence, an emergency.
775 N.W.2d at 235.
The South Dakota Supreme Court further found that the community caretaker exception
has been recognized only in the context of automobiles by the United States Supreme Court,
citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). Id. at 235.
II.

Emergency Aid Doctrine.

If the emergency aid doctrine is encompassed within the community caretaking function,
the question then arises as to whether the emergency aid doctrine can be analyzed as a separate,
stand-alone ground to justify the entry into Ms. Posey's home. It is Ms. Posey's assertion that it
cannot. However, in the event the Court should view it as a separate ground upon which the
entry into Ms. Posey's home could be justified, Ms. Posey submits the following argument under
the emergency aid doctrine.
In Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), the United States Supreme Court
ruled that an officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant, and that an action is "reasonable" under
the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, "as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action." 547 U.S. at 404. (Citation omitted.)
(Emphasis in original.) In United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947 (9 th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted a two-pronged test that asks whether: (1) considering the totality of the
circumstances, law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there
was an immediate need to protect others or themselves from serious harm; and (2) the search's
scope and manner were reasonable to meet the need. 515 F.3d at 952.
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The State cites State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432 (et. App. 1996) and Brigham City, Utah v.
Stuart, supra, in support of its argument that the emergency aid doctrine justified Officer

Avriett's forced entry into Ms. Posey's home. However, both of these cases involve acts of
physical violence in progress, and are distinguishable. In Sailas, the police officer responded to
a domestic dispute in progress. 129 Idaho at 433. When the officer approached the apartment
building, she could hear yelling and screaming coming from the apartment. Id.

The officer

knocked on the door, and the female who answered the door had blood on her nose and hands.

Id.

The officer could see Sailas and a small child inside the apartment. Id.

The argument

between Sailas and the female was continuing, and Sailas was shouting and making threats of
harm against the female, even though a police officer was present. Id.
In Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, supra, police officers responded to a call regarding a
loud party at a residence. 547 U.S. at 400 - 401. The officers heard shouting from inside. Id. at
401.

The officers entered the backyard, and saw-through a screen door and windows-an

altercation taking place in the kitchen. Id. Four adults were attempting, with some difficulty, to
restrain a juvenile. Id.

The juvenile struck one of the adults in the face.

Id.

The officer

observed the victim of the blow spitting blood into a nearby sink. Id. The other adults continued
to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him up against a refrigerator with such force that the
refrigerator began moving across the floor. Id. At this point, an officer opened the screen door
and announced the officers' presence. Id. Amid the tumult, nobody noticed. Id. The officer
entered the kitchen and again cried out, and as the occupants slowly became aware that the
police were on the scene, the altercation ceased.
In the current case, there was no physical violence in progress. Officer A vriett knew that
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any injury Ms. Posey sustained was as the result of a motor vehicle collision, and that action on
his part was not necessary to prevent further injury.

In Sailas and Brigham City, the law

enforcement officers saw the injured parties with their own eyes prior to entry into the
residences, and entry into the residences was necessary in order to restore peace and prevent
further physical injury. While Officer A vriett may reasonably rely on the information provided
by the citizen bystander as to what the bystander had observed about Ms. Posey's physical
condition, Officer A vriett was also aware of additional facts that put in context what the
bystander told him:

injuries to occupants of the vehicle that Ms. Posey collided with were

minor; and Ms. Posey was physically capable of walking home from the crash scene, a distance
of several blocks.
It was not objectively reasonable for Officer Avriett to conclude from Ms. Posey's refusal
to open the front door to him that Ms. Posey was injured and in need of immediate assistance.
Ihis is particularly in light of Officer Avriett's own testimony at the suppression hearing that he
"wasn't sure if the person was either trying to barricade the door or trying to open it themselves",
Ir. p. 12, L. 20 - 21 1, and that Officer A vriett referred to past experiences when people want to
hide from the police. Tr. p. 13, L. 8

10; L. 14 - 15. Even after forcibly breaking open the front

door to Ms. Posey's house there were less intrusive means of determining Ms. Posey's physical
condition short of barging into the home and grabbing her, such as asking the "elderly
gentleman" Officer Avriett encountered about her condition.

Tr. p. 13, L. 25; p. 14, L. 1.

Instead of asking the elderly gentleman about Ms. Posey's condition, however, Officer A vriett
asked him "where the female was that had come in the house." Tr. p. 14, L. 3 - 5.

I

Transcript of hearing on Posey's Motion to Suppress held on May 27, 2011.
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CONCLUSION
Officer Avriett' s forced entry into Posey's home was unlawful, because there is no
exception to the warrant requirement that applies in this case. There is no Idaho appellate court
opinion that has applied the community caretaking function to a police officer's entry into a
home. While there is some split among the federal circuit courts on the issue, the majority of
federal circuit courts who have ruled on the issue, including the 9th Circuit, have found that the
community caretaking function is not applicable to entry into a home. In addition, at least two
state supreme courts have made the same ruling.

In addition, the State has not met its burden of establishing that (1) considering the
totality of the circumstances, law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding
that there was an immediate need to protect others or themselves from serious harm; and (2) the
search's scope and manner were reasonable to meet the need. Officer Avriett did not break in to
the home out of concern for Posey's welfare.

Officer Avriett was clearly attempting to

apprehend Posey, whom he suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. Before entering
Posey's home, however, Officer Avriett lacked probable cause to arrest Posey for the offense of
driving under the influence of alcohol.
Because the evidence that Posey was under the influence of alcohol was obtained as a
direct result of exploitation of the illegal entry into her home, any evidence against Posey that
was obtained after Officer Avriett broke into her home must be suppressed, pursuant to the
exclusionary rule.
DATED this

~

day of December, 2012.
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